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During the first week of December, President Trump hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This contrast exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and ending wars—though how this aligns with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This pivot is consequential, but experts note it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Tensions

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Involvement

A similar standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.